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The Barrier and the Damage Done
Converting the Canadian Mounted Rifles 
to Infantry, December 1915
W I L L I A M  F. S T E W A R T
Abstract: The Canadian Mounted Rifles were a rising phenomenon in 
the prewar period based on military exigency, the need for a form of 
light cavalry and mobile firepower, the financial realities governing the 
Canadian military, the success of mounted rifles in the Second Boer 
War, and a supposed affinity of Canadians for this form of warfare. 
When tested on the Western Front in a minor operation, however, the 
mounted rifles floundered, which confirmed the decision to convert them 
into infantry because of their unsuitable organisation, leadership flaws, 
the demand for more infantry, and tensions between senior commanders.
“Regarding the 1st and 2nd Mounted Brigades, I stated that I 
considered their discipline and training not what it should be. I am still 
of that opinion, and the sooner those responsible for that discipline and 
training realize this truth the better for all concerned.” Major-General 
Arthur Currie, 10 December 1915
“The consternation raised at Canadian Headquarters by this barrier 
was tremendous, quite out of proportion to the causes....” Johnston G. 
Chalmers
In the d ar k  of the new moon of 2 December 1915, Silesians of the 11th Reserve Infantry Regiment (r ir) crept to within 125 metres 
of the Canadian frontline and built a three-metre high barrier across
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the Ploegstreet-Messines road.1 The defending Canadian Mounted 
Rifles’ (cm r) failure to prevent the Barrier’s construction or to 
destroy it was the final confirmation of the Canadian Corps’ high 
command’s judgment that the cmr were not suited for service on the 
Western Front, with the result that they were converted to infantry. 
In terms of Canadian operations, this minor skirmish would not 
merit mention, except that it dealt a blow to a military concept that 
was a centrepiece of Canadian prewar defence policy. This article will 
examine what the mounted rifles were, how they became important, 
their suitability for operations on the Western Front, what happened 
at the Barrier, and its consequences.
There is little Canadian historiographical interest in the mounted 
rifles despite the important position the cmr held in Canadian 
prewar defence considerations. In comparison, the Australian Light 
Horse (alh), the equivalent to the cmr , continues to be a subject 
of considerable popular and scholarly interest, including two major 
Australian war movies, The Lighthorsemen (1987) and Gallipoli 
(1981), and a website with over 12,000 entries.2 While there are 
regimental histories of two of the converted cmr battalions and a 
history of the Royal Canadian Dragoons (rcd), there are no academic 
studies on the Canadian phenomena of the mounted rifles.3 There 
is a rich historiography on the role of cavalry in the British Army 
from the Second Boer War to the First World War, as well as a 
thesis on the Canadian Cavalry Brigade.4 Standard histories of the 
Canadian army by Granatstein, Morton, and Stanley only briefly
1 “Barrier” is capitalised here and throughout the article to distinguish it from 
other obstacles and to denote its importance. German formations are italicised.
2 For more on the popular memory of the ALH, see Jean Bou, Light Horse: A 
History of Australia’s Mounted Arm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 1-3; “Australian Light Horse Studies Centre,” http://alh-research.tripod. 
com/Light_Horse/.
3 S. G. Bennett, The 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles, 1914-1919 (Toronto: Murray 
Printing, 1926); Johnston, The 2nd CMR; Brereton Greenhous, Dragoon: The 
Centennial History of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1883-1983 (Belleville, Ont.: 
Guild of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1983).
4 Some of the works include David Kenyon, Horsemen in No Man’s Land: British 
Cavalry and Trench Warfare 1914-1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2011); 
Spencer Jones, From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 
1902-1914 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012); Stephen Badsey, Doctrine 
and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880-1918 (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2008); Stephanie Elizabeth Potter, “ ‘Smile and Carry On’: Canadian Cavalry on the 
Western Front, 1914-1918,” PhD, University of Western Ontario, 2013.
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touch on the mounted rifles, if at all.5 Even books focused on the 
prewar developments such as Morton’s A Canadian General, Miller’s 
A Knight in Politics, and Wood’s Militia Myths, make only passing 
references to mounted rifles despite their popularity leading up to the 
First World War.6 Campaign accounts of the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force (c e f) such as Cook’s At the Sharp End and Nicholson’s official 
history describe, in vivid detail, the initial successful November 1915 
raid on German positions by the 2nd Infantry Brigade but do not 
discuss the reasons for the cmr conversion.7 The sole article on the 
Barrier was in The Legionary in 1935 by Edwin Pye, on the staff of 
the official historian. The focus of the article was on the successful 
attack by the 5th Battalion and included a brief description of the 
earlier cmr abortive operations but not the consequences.8 Owing in 
part to the heavy losses suffered by the cmr formations at Mount 
Sorrel and on the Somme in 1916, few personal papers of cmr members 
survive from the period covered.9
DEFINITIONS
The differences between the forms of mounted forces can be 
confusing, so it is necessary to define the terms used in this period. 
In the British army’s parlance, which the Canadian military 
followed, mounted troops encompassed cavalry, mounted infantry, 
mounted rifles, and yeomanry. British cavalry in 1914 fought in two
5 J. L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002), 27, 42-25; Desmond Morton, A Military History 
of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007), 98, 106-107; George F. 
G. Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People, 3rd ed. 
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974), 256, 266, 281.
6 Desmond Morton, The Canadian General: Sir William Otter (Toronto: A.M. 
Hakkert, 1974), 143, 147, 233, 242; Carman Miller, A Knight in Politics: A Biography 
of Sir Frederick Borden (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010); James A. 
Wood, Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921 (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2010), 88, 91 124-125.
7 Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916 
(Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 191, 347; G. W. L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary 
Force, 1914-1919 (Ottawa: R. Duhamel, Queen’s Printer, 1964), 124-125, 134.
8 “La Petite Douve” and How the 5th Battalion Crashed the Barricade, the 
Legionary, July 1935, Edwin Pye, GAQ 5-66, RG24 v1825, LAC.
9 A rare exception was Captain John Symons, who is quoted later in the paper, 
served in the 4th CMR and died at Mount Sorrel.
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ranks— mounted and dismounted— with rifles, swords, and in lancer 
regiments with lances and could deliver cavalry charges. Mounted 
infantry were foot soldiers who rode horses for mobility. They fought 
exclusively on foot and were not instructed or regarded as horse- 
soldiers.10 Yeomanry and mounted rifles were considered cavalry 
soldiers, also trained to fight mounted and dismounted but with 
the rifle as their principal weapon and in a single rank.11 These 
were part-time soldiers, and the army did not believe there was 
sufficient time to train them to cavalry standards for shock action. 
The implications of this meant the mounted rifles drilled to perform 
all the functions of cavalry other than the charge, including scouting, 
counter-reconnaissance, raiding, and outpost duties. As the Earl of 
Dundonald, the British commander of the Canadian militia, stated 
in his foreword to the Canadian Cavalry Training, 1904  manual: 
“The rifle, then, is the weapon for cavalry in the future; especially for 
cavalry like the Canadian which has but a short time for training.”12 
The considerable instruction needed to create cavalry capable of 
launching successful charges was a function of training the men to 
wield bladed weapons on horseback and the horses and men to ride 
stirrup to stirrup in a concentrated mass at speed. The Germans 
determined that although their cavalry conscripts had two years of 
service there was insufficient time to develop them to be proficient 
both in mounted and firepower tactics.13
MOUNTED RIFLES PREWAR HISTORY
At Confederation, the Canadian military had no significant history 
with traditional cavalry as Canada’s closed-in terrain limited the 
use of cavalry.14 The initial Canadian militia forces were primarily 
infantry; with the cavalry so little esteemed that in the Fenian 
raids of 1866 the authorities called them out too late to fight at the
10 Army Great Britain, Field Service Regulations. Part I. Operations. igog with 
Amendments 1912 (London, 1912), 14-15.
11 The Yeomanry were British Territorial Army troops, which were part-time 
soldiers, like the Canadian Militia. War Office General Staff, Yeomanry and Mounted 
Rilfes Training - Part I  & II (War Office, 1912), para 1.
12 Cavalry Training Canada 1904 (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1904), i.
13 Badsey, British Cavalry, 49.
14 Greenhous, Dragoon: The Centennial History, 54.
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Battle of Ridgeway.15 The limited role of cavalry and the high cost of 
raising, training, and maintaining cavalry regiments were powerful 
disincentives to raising mounted units. Accordingly between 1869  
and 1 8 8 3 , the government authorised thirty-one infantry regiments 
but only five cavalry regiments, and those few probably only to 
satisfy social status requirements and to provide scouting.16
In 1883, the government established a small Permanent Force 
(pf) to provide an instructional cadre to the more numerous part­
time soldiers of Canada’s Non-Permanent Active Militia (Militia).17 
Included in this new regular army was a troop of cavalry for 
instructional, garrison, and ceremonial duties. In the aftermath of 
the North-West Rebellion of 1885, where extemporised volunteer 
mounted forces provided most of the scouting functions, the military 
established a school of mounted infantry in Winnipeg to train the 
local militia.18 In 1892, the commander of the Canadian forces 
amalgamated the two mounted units of the pf into what became 
the Royal Canadian Dragoons.19 By 1900, the Canadian cavalry was 
languishing with only eleven regiments in comparison with eighty- 
eight infantry regiments.
While the terrain in central Canada was poor cavalry country, 
there was still a need for the traditional functions of light cavalry—  
scouting, raiding, and outpost duties. The answer to the conundrum 
of how to provide cavalry that did not require extensive training 
was mounted rifles. In the open spaces of British-occupied frontier 
societies in the nineteenth century, such as Australia, South Africa, 
and Canada, the authorities needed rifle-armed forces able to cover 
ground swiftly, scout, and do outpost duty. The British first raised 
a form of mounted rifles in the South African Cape Colony in 1827. 
Usually on the frontier, highly-trained cavalry capable of shock action 
were not available or suitable, but volunteers who could ride hard, 
shoot straight, and fight mounted and dismounted would suffice. The 
success of the volunteers in this role during the North-West Rebellion
15 Ibid., 6-8.
16 Ibid., 10.
17 Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 
1868-1904 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 84.
18 Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers, 256.
19 Morton, The Canadian General, 147.
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“Surrender of Commandant Botha to Canadian Mounted Rifles (ca. 1902)” by Arthur H. 
Hider. [Arthur H. Hider collection. Library and Archives Canada, 2010-00043-9, Box 2000832240]
and the Boers in the Majuba campaign of the First Boer War in 1881 
validated the concept.20
The experience of cavalry in the American Civil War acting as a 
mobile force providing light cavalry functions also stimulated interest 
in mounted rifles. Armed with rifles and in the case of the Federals, 
repeating ones, the cavalry fought almost exclusively as a form of 
mounted rifles.21 This experience had a powerful influence on George 
Denison, the Canadian author of Modern Cavalry who argued the 
time of the arme blanche had passed and firepower was key for 
the cavalry.22 Denison, in turn influenced British cavalry reformers, 
like Edward Hutton who commanded both the Canadian and 
Australian militaries at the turn of the century.23 Hutton was part 
of a long, spirited debate in the British army and other continental 
armies regarding the role of cavalry with the introduction of rifles, 
machine guns, and rapid firing artillery. During this debate, the 
British army raised mounted infantry and mounted rifles units as
20 Bou, Light Horse, 11-22.
21 Potter, “Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front,” 19.
22 George Denison, Modern Cavalry: Its Organisation, Armament, and Employment 
in War (London: Thomas Bosworth, 1868), 10, 13.
23 Ibid., Bou, Light Horse, 6.
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a way of reducing the cost of mounted forces.24 Two proponents of 
this approach, Edward Hutton (1898-1900) and Earl of Dundonald 
(1902-1904), were commanders of the Canadian Militia, and they 
played a major part in fostering mounted rifles in Canada.25 This 
concept was further bolstered by its alignment with the Canadian 
self-image as rugged, independent, and resilient frontiersmen who 
were consummate horsemen and expert marksmen. Thus, Canadian 
volunteers required minimal training to be effective mounted rifle 
troopers. Major-General L. Herbert, the British commander of the 
Canadian Militia in 1892 described them as “full of fair, manly spirit, 
full of zeal and the very stuff that makes fine soldiers.”26
The final and arguably most critical influence was the success 
of mounted rifles on both sides in the Second Boer War. The Boers, 
fighting in the manner of mounted rifles, stymied the forces of the 
British Empire for over two and a half years and mounted rifles units 
from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa performed 
well and, in some cases, outshone their British equivalents.27 The 
Canadian engagements at Leliefontein, where the rcd won three 
Victoria Crosses (vcs), or the detachment of four Canadians of 
the 2nd cmr who held off sixty Boers at Honing Spruit on 22 June 
1900 demonstrated what the cmr could achieve.28 The majority of 
Canadian units raised for the Boer War were a form of mounted 
rifles, with seven regiments of cm r, twelve squadrons of South African 
Constabulary, and Strathcona’s Horse, a privately-raised mounted 
rifles regiment, while only one infantry battalion served overseas.29
All these threads combined made a convincing case for expanding 
mounted rifles in Canada, as it solved the challenge of providing a 
form of light cavalry and mobile firepower, at a cost acceptable to the 
Canadian government, and that matched the supposed nature and 
sensibilities of Canadians. The result was a great increase in mounted 
rifles units, with twenty-five regiments authorised, or converted from
24 Badsey, British Cavalry, 63.
25 Ibid., 61; Bou, Light Horse, 26; Morton, Ministers and Generals, 134.
26 Morton, The Canadian General, 142.
27 Badsey, British Cavalry, 90.
28 For more on how the Canadians performed see William Stewart, “Richard 
Turner’s South African Campaign,” The Canadian Army Journal 14, no. 2 (2012).
29 The 1st CMR was renamed the RCD part way through its service in South 
Africa. The only infantry unit to serve in South Africa was the 2nd Battalion, Royal 
Canadian Regiment.
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infantry from 1901 to 1913 out of the thirty-five cavalry regiments in 
the militia in 1914— only fifteen infantry regiments were authorised 
in the same period.30 Based on the popularity of the mounted rifles 
and population trends, most of these units formed in the western and 
central provinces.31 The British head of the Canadian Militia, Earl of 
Dundonald, abolished the sword in Canadian cavalry when he took 
command in 1902 effectively converting all the Canadian cavalry 
into mounted rifles.32 He established this principle in his Cavalry 
Training Canada 1904 manual that governed Canadian training until 
the British 1912 Yeomanry and Mounted, Rifles manual superseded 
it, and it continued the policy of only training in firepower tactics. 
For instance, in the western militia camps from 1911, drill focused 
on mounted rifle tactics, musketry practice, and dismounted and 
mounted movement, with only one exercise including a charge.33
WAR
With Britain’s declaration of war on 4  August 1 9 1 4 , Canada was 
also at war, although it could determine the nature and scope of its 
contribution to the war effort.34 The British government accepted 
the offer of a Canadian infantry division on 6 August.35 Accordingly, 
the large number of militia mounted rifle units contributed men, 
with units such as the 5 th Battalion (Western Cavalry) consisting 
primarily of men from mounted rifles regiments. No militia mounted 
rifles regiments accompanied the pf rcd and Lord Strathcona’s 
Horse (lsh) regiments in the First Contingent.36
30 This total includes the largely nominal 33rd Vaudreuil and Solanges Hussars and one 
regiment was disbanded. The infantry total includes the 1st Canadian Grenadier Guards. 
Department of Militia and Defence, The Quarterly Militia List of the Dominion of Canada 
(Corrected to June 30, 1914) (Ottawa: Department of Militia and Defence, 1914).
31 Wood, Militia Myths, 88, 124-125.
32 Badsey, British Cavalry, 62.
33 Potter, “Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front,” 49.
34 A. Fortescue Duguid, The Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919, vol. 1 
(Ottawa: Minister of National Defence, 1938), 7.
35 Ibid., 5-23.
36 The 6th Battalion was formed primarily from the Fort Gary Horse and went 
overseas as an infantry battalion. A. Fortescue Duguid, The Canadian Forces in the 
Great War 1914-1919, Chronology, Appendices and Maps, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Minister 
of National Defence, 1938), Appendix 85.
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Before the First Contingent arrived in England in October 1914, 
the Canadian government offered a second, including four regiments 
of cm r . The War Office was noncommittal about accepting the offer, 
but, despite this lack of interest, the government authorised these 
regiments on 7 November 1914. Part of the rationale was to satisfy 
western Canadian demands for greater participation by the mounted 
arm.37 Shortly thereafter, the Militia Council authorised a further nine 
regiments after Turkey’s declaration of war in the expectation of mobile 
operations in Egypt and a break in the deadlock on the Western 
Front.38 The British War Office accepted the four cmr regiments for 
service in Egypt and asked how many more Canada could raise.39 
As an indication of the Minister of Militia Sam Hughes’ confidence 
in the cmr readiness, he claimed Canada could send a brigade of 
three cmr regiments to Egypt in January 1915, if the British provided 
transports and escorts, with another brigade to follow a month later. 
Hughes’ estimate was wildly off-base as the cmr brigades did not reach 
England until the summer of 1915, and, as will be discussed, there 
were serious doubts regarding their training and capability.40
The Militia Council formed two cmr Brigades, each with three 
regiments. The Council appointed Lieutenant-Colonel F.O. Sissons to 
command the 1stst cmr Brigade consisting of the 1stst, 2ndnd, and 
3rdrd cmr Regiments and Colonel C.A. Smart to lead the 2nd cmr 
Brigade composed of the 4th, 5th, and 6th cmr Regiments. Francis 
Ogletree Sissons, forty-one years old, was a successful horseman and 
rancher with extensive land holdings around Medicine Hat, Alberta. 
He raised the 21st Hussar Regiment in Medicine Hat in 1908, as part 
of the expansion of mounted rifles regiments, and commanded it as 
a Lieutenant-Colonel until his transfer to the Retired Officers’ list in 
December 1913.41 The Militia Council appointed him to command 
the Alberta-based 3rdrd cmr Regiment on 12 November 1914.42 The
37 Ibid., Appendix 254.
38 Once in England, the 7th to 13th CMR regiments, like the majority of the 
Canadian infantry battalions, were disbanded for replacements. Barbara Wilson, 
“Guide to Sources Relating to Units of the Canadian Expeditionary Force - Canadian 
Mounted Rifles,” (Library and Archives, Canada, 2012).
39 Duguid, Canadian Forces in the Great War - Appendices, Appendix 8.
40 Ibid., 434.
41 Defence, Quarterly Militia List; “Fonds Med-371 - Frances Ogletree Sissons 
Family Fonds,” available at http://www.albertaonrecord.ca/frances-ogletree-sissons- 
family-fonds.
42 F.O. Sissons Service Jacket, RG150 Acc1992-93/166, Box 8953, LAC.
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Col. F.O. Sissons, heading a parade of the Third Canadian Mounted Rifles (3rd CMR) down 
Second Street SE in Medicine Hat. [Esplanade Arts & Heritage Centre Archives, Harry Maxwell 
Family Fonds, 0433.0001]
Council provisionally selected Colonel Victor Williams, a pf cavalry 
officer to command the 1st cmr Brigade. Sam Steele, the commander 
of Military District #10, which included Alberta, protested the 
order as “I regret to state that I consider that this appointment 
to command of the 1st Brigade C.M .R. would be unpopular in the 
West at the present time.” Instead, Steele recommended Sissons as 
a superior candidate with longer service than other prospects, more 
experience, and was respected in the West.43 Steele’s plea worked, 
and the Council appointed Sissons to command the 1st cmr Brigade 
on 1 March 1915.44
At the start of the war, Smart was a colonel commanding the 
4th Eastern Township Mounted Brigade, a prominent cavalry officer, 
and the president of the Canadian Cavalry Association. He was forty- 
seven, a wealthy manufacturer, and well connected in Quebec and 
Conservative circles. He was friends with John Wallace Carson, Sam 
Hughes’s ‘Special Representative’ in England, one of the conduits 
through which Hughes controlled affairs in England. Smart regularly
43 Steele to Secretary, Miltary Council, 16 February 1915, HQ 593-4-1 (A-D), RG 
24 v1366, LAC.
44 F.O. Sissons Service Jacket, LAC.
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corresponded with Carson and was quite willing to use the connection 
to advocate for promotion and preferment.45 On 26 January, the 
Adjutant-General provisionally appointed Smart to command the 
2nd cmr Brigade, but he did not get permission to form the brigade 
until 18 May 1915.46
In a decision that was to have major consequences for the mounted 
rifles, the cmr Brigades were to serve in France as dismounted 
infantry. In May 1915, in the aftermath of the costly Second Battle 
of Ypres and the Battle of Festubert, the Canadians lacked trained 
replacements, so the Adjutant-General requested the cmr agreement 
to serve at the front as dismounted units. Smart agreed, but only 
if the existing organisation and establishments were retained, and 
that they were “to be mounted when the British War Office required 
mounted troops.”47 The Adjutant-General responded that there he 
saw no ‘present reason’ why the organisation would have to change, 
which indicates the extent to which Canadian authorities were 
unaware of the realities of the Western Front.48 It was likely that 
if the cmr served in Egypt, they would have been hampered by a 
poorly managed rear base given the chaotic experience of Canadian 
administration in England up to late 1916.49
Raised in the winter of 1914-1915, the cmr were scattered in small 
units owing to the shortage of large training and billeting facilities, 
and this hindered their training. The Yeomanry and Mounted, Rifles 
manual of 1912 guided the cmr instruction, supplemented by bayonet, 
entrenching, and signalling training.50 Much of the mounted training 
was of limited value to units that were to fight as infantry. Further, 
the men spent three-and-a-quarter hours a day on stable duties, which 
detracted from their time available for other training tasks.51 As a 
result, the cmr received less relevant training for their future duties
45 Defence, Quarterly Militia List; Smart to Carson, 23 September 1915, 6-S-19, 
RG9 III-A-1 v213, LAC; Smart, Charles Allen Service Jacket, RG150 Acc92-93 
v8993, LAC.
46 AAG 4th Divison to Smart, 18 May 1915, 45-6-1, RG24 v4483, LAC.
47 Smart to OC 4th Division, 18 May 1915, 45-6-1, RG24 v4483, LAC.
48 AG 4th Division to Smart, 20 May 1915, 45-6-1, RG24 v4483, LAC.
49 For more on the chaos, see Desmond Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics 
(University of Toronto Press, 1982). William F. Stewart, “ ‘Every Inch a Soldier’: 
New Perspectives on the Military Career of a Controversial Canadian General, Sir 
Richard Turner,” PhD, University of Birmingham, 2012, Chapter 5.
50 OC 4th CMR to GSO, 2nd Division, 7 May 1915, 34-3-15, RG24 v4335, LAC.
51 Potter, “Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front,” 76.
11
: The Barrier and the Damage Done Converting the Canadian Mounted Rifles to Infantry, December 1915
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
296 : T h e  B a r r ie r  a n d  th e  D a m a g e  D o n e
than an infantry unit for the same period of instruction. There were 
many complaints about the low standard of infantry training conducted 
in Canada, but it was still of greater value than the cmr stable duties, 
riding outposts, and practicing raids. There were complaints from 
within certain cmr units that after seven months of training, the men 
still did not have horses and had not fired their rifles.52
The 1st cm r Brigade arrived in England in June 1915 and the 2nd 
cmr Brigade in July.53 Once in England, their training focused more 
appropriately on route marches, entrenching, and bomb throwing.54 
The cmr ethos, however, was still oriented to their mounted role, 
as the 4th cmr Regiment did not turn in its spurs until nine days 
before crossing to France.55 While in England, the commander of 
the 6th cmr Regiment lost his position when he was found drunk on 
manoeuvres and later escaped detention, which would not have raised 
the reputation of the cmr leadership in the minds of the Canadian 
Corps’ senior commanders.56 Both brigades spent approximately three 
months in England in training to prepare for the front, with the 1st 
cmr Brigade reaching France on 22 September and the 2nd Brigade 
on 24-25 October.57 The 1st cmr Regiment began its first tour in the 
frontlines on 4 October 1915 and was relieved a week later.58 For most 
of October and November, the 1st cmr Brigade provided work parties 
every night and so had little opportunity for additional training. In 
total, it received less than a month training in France.
Alderson identified problems with the cmr almost immediately 
they arrived. Alderson inspected the 3rd cmr Regiment on 12 October 
1915, and he sharply criticised the shabby state of the men, harnesses, 
and saddlery. Surprisingly, his long list of criticisms was documented 
in the regimental war diary, because most war diaries scrupulously
52 Slowness of CMR Training, C.9-75 RG25 A-2 v151, LAC.
53 Wilson, “Guide to Sources Relating to Units of the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force - Canadian Mounted Rifles,” 2, 5.
54 War Diary, 4th Regiment Canadian Mounted Rifles, 17 and 20 September 1915, 
RG9 III-D-3 v4947, LAC.
55 Ibid., 15 October 1915.
56 No verdict was recorded in the available court martial papers, although it is likely 
he was convicted. R.H. Ryan Court Martial, September 1915, 9857-1, RG150 8, LAC.
57 War Diary, 1st Regiment Canadian Mounted Rifles, 22 September 1915, RG9 
III-D-3 v4946, LAC; War Diary, 2nd Brigade Canadian Mounted Rifles, 25 October 
1915, RG9 III-D-3 v4946, LAC.
58 W.D., 1st CMR Regiment, 4 October 1915, LAC.
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Canadian Mounted Rifles recruitment 
campaign. [Library and Archives Canada 
C-095277]
avoided recording negative comments.59 In another uncommon step, 
the war diary of the 2nd cmr Regiment directly condemned the 1st 
cmr Brigade’s leadership with “The Regiment is and has been rather 
handicapped owing to lack of information or explanation re Brigade 
orders and administration generally.”60
Initially, there was no meaningful role for the cmr Brigades, as 
they were effectively reduced to labour units in October and most of 
November. Alderson wrote the British Army Council on 19 November 
recommending converting the cmr into infantry, as part of a third 
Canadian division. The existing organisation made it difficult to 
arrange reliefs of infantry units.61 Alderson convinced the Council 
that it was necessary to convert the cmr into an infantry brigade. 
The Canadian government approved the proposal on 3 December.62
59 War Diary, 3rd Regiment Canadian Mounted Rifles, 12 October 1915, RG9 
III-D-3 v4946, LAC.
60 War Diary, 2nd Regiment Canadian Mounted Rifles, 16 October 1916, RG9 
III-D-3 v4947, LAC.
61 Alderson to Army Council, 19 November 1915, 8-8-8A, RG9 III-A-1 v43.
62 Proposal for 3rd Division, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor 
General, 26 November 1916, RG24 v6996, LAC.
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The 2nd cmr Brigade was attached to Major-General Arthur 
Currie’s 1st Division for training purposes, as was the common 
practice.63 Unfortunately, the commander of the 2nd cmr Brigade, 
Colonel Smart, had less than a month with the brigade before falling 
ill. He remained in the barracks from 24 November 1916 until 16 
December 1916, so he missed the Barrier engagements.64 He was 
diagnosed with diabetes in May 1916, which probably explains his 
illness.65 Like the 1st cmr Brigade, the 2nd spent most of October 
and November providing work parties.
BARRIER
Currie was eager to give his 2 nd Infantry Brigade a rest and an 
opportunity to train after six months in the line without relief.66 
Accordingly, on 22 November 1915 Seely’s Force replaced the 2nd 
Infantry Brigade for a two-week period, later extended by another 
week.67 Seely’s Force was an improvised formation consisting of 
Brigadier-General J.E.B. Seely’s Canadian Cavalry Brigade and the 
1st cmr and 2nd cmr Brigades, but without any additional staff 
or communications support for Seely’s headquarters. It reported to 
the 1st Division. Seely was a British politician from a wealthy coal 
mining family and firmly enmeshed in the highest echelons of British 
society. Seely served in the Boer War with distinction as a squadron 
commander in a yeomanry regiment and won the Distinguished 
Service Order (dso). He was a rising star in the British Liberal 
Party when the British prime minster appointed him the secretary 
of state for war in June 1912. Seely, however, had to resign during 
the Curragh Incident in March 1914, where Anglo-Irish cavalry 
officers quit over the possibility they would have to suppress Ulster 
Protestant forces contesting the government’s plan for Irish home
63 W.D., 2nd CMR Brigade, 6 October 1915, LAC.
64 Smart, Charles Allen Service Jacket, LAC; W.D., 2nd CMR Brigade, 16 
December 1916, LAC.
65 Smart, Charles Allen Service Jacket, LAC.
66 War Diary, 5th Battalion, 22 November 1915, RG9 III-D-3 v4949, LAC.
67 1st Canadian Division to Canadian Corps, 7 December 1915, 11/16, RG9 III-D-2 
v3 9 8 7 , LAC.
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Kitchener’s two targets: Brigadier-General 
Seely talks to Sam Hughes on the left, 
August 1916. [Canadian War Museum EO- 
0686]
rule.68 Without consulting the Canadian government, Field Marshal 
H. Kitchener, the secretary of state for war appointed Seely to lead 
the Canadian Cavalry Brigade on 28 January 1915. The brigade 
consisted of the rcd , lsh , and King Edward’s Horse (keh ), an 
imperial regiment of men from the dominions residing in Britain. 
According to Seely’s grandson, this appointment accomplished two 
ends. It sidetracked Seely, and clipped the wings of the obstreperous 
Canadian minister of militia, Sam Hughes.69
By all accounts, Seely— ‘tall, thin and elegant’— was personable, 
but he was in a difficult position. There were abundant militia 
politicians in the cef without saddling it with a British one. Seely’s 
qualifications were comparable to many cef commanders, however, 
the other British officers in the cef were all professionals and 
usually highly-trained. Seely was not a professional, had no staff
68 One of the leaders of this protest was Hubert Gough, who Canadian commanders 
later intensely disliked because of his command practices on the Somme in 1916. For 
more on the Curragh Incident, see Ian Frederick William Beckett, The Army and 
the Curragh Incident, 1914, vol. 2 (Toronto: Random House of Canada Ltd, 1986); 
Brough Scott, Galloper Jack: A Grandson’s Search for a Forgotten Hero (London: 
Macmillan, 2003), 146-147; Potter, “Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front,” 54.
69 Scott, Galloper Jack, 190.
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2nd Infantry Brigade and Seely’s Detachment Defensive Scheme Comparison. [By author]
training, and had not served with the Canadians, and the senior 
British commanders in the British Expeditionary Force (bef) had 
grave doubts regarding Seely’s competence.70 As a result, there was a 
natural tension between Currie, who resented political interference, 
and Seely, the British embodiment of this influence.71
A critical issue in employing the cmr on the Western Front was 
their organisation was poorly suited for the conditions. Seely’s Force 
required three times as many headquarters dugouts as the brigade it 
replaced, because it included three mounted brigades each of three 
regiments with three squadrons totalling twenty-seven squadrons
70 For more on the complaints see Haig Diary, 5, 21 November, 1916, Part 1 No. 
96, Haig’s Autograph Great War Diary, Haig Papers; NLS; Kiggel to Canadian 
Representative, O.B./742, 25 January 1916, 177/6, RG 9 III-D-1 v4746, LAC. Seely’s 
grandson and Potter, in her thesis on the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, argue Seely 
was the victim of animus from the Curragh Incident. Scott, Galloper Jack, 223-224; 
Potter, “Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front,” 74, 261-266.
71 A. M. J. Hyatt, “Sir Arthur Currie and Politicians: A Case of Study of Civil- 
Military Relations in the First World War,” in Richard Preston and Peter Dennis, 
eds., Swords and Covenants (Croom and Helm, 1976), 151, 159; Tim Cook, The 
Madman and the Butcher (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2010), 180.
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and thirteen headquarters of regimental strength or greater.72 In 
contrast, the 2nd Infantry Brigade had sixteen companies and five 
headquarters (one brigade and four battalion headquarters). The 
infantry were organised in groups of four, with four companies to 
a battalion and four battalions to a brigade. The mounted forces 
consisted of sub-units of three, with three squadrons composing a 
regiment and three regiments a brigade. Each squadron was roughly 
two-thirds the strength of an infantry company, so a cmr regiment, 
with an establishment of 552 all ranks, including twenty-four officers, 
could field only slightly more than half the men of a full-strength 
infantry battalion.73 Further, a cmr regiment had a higher allowance 
of specialists, such as saddle makers, shoe-smiths and farriers for 
the 594 horses assigned to the unit. Contrast this with the war 
establishment for an infantry battalion with thirty officers, 991 other 
ranks, and sixty-six horses.74
These problems were not intractable, as three alh brigades 
overcame the challenges when committed dismounted to the Gallipoli 
campaign. They had the same issues of the lack of interchangeability 
and excess headquarters, but the solution was to permanently assign 
them a portion of the front, and they performed well.75 Throughout 
the war on the Western Front, British cavalry divisions served 
as dismounted formations holding the line, and by 1916, British 
command developed a standard formation that alleviated some of 
the issues that confronted the c m r . Each cavalry brigade served 
as a dismounted battalion of approximately similar strength to an 
infantry battalion but consisting of three over-strength companies, 
each provided by one of the three cavalry regiments. This allowed 
the insertion of dismounted forces without disarranging the defensive 
scheme, unlike the situation with the c m r .76
Seely’s Force defended the extreme southern sector of the 
Canadian Corps, approximately 3,000 metres south of the Belgian
72 Regiments consisting of LSH, KEH, RCD, and the six CMR regiments.
73 A Regiment of Mounted Rifles, War Establishment, 2 January 1915, 34-3-12, 
RG24 V4335, LAC.
74 The two Canadian divisions at the front followed this establishment. Divisional 
Establishment 1915 and Amendments; War Establishments Part VII. New Armies 
1915 LAC, RG24 v22003, LAC, 20.
75 Bou, Light Horse, 144.
76 Bruce I. Gudmundsson and Duncan Anderson, The British Army on the Western 
Front, 1916, Battle Orders (Oxford; New York: Osprey Pub., 2007), 32-33.
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town of Messines in the Douve River valley. The Douve was a slow 
meandering river, which was subject to frequent flooding in the rainy 
conditions of the winter of 1915-1916. Most of the valley area was 
sodden and likely to be under water after a heavy rainfall. The road 
running between Messines and Ploegsteert to the southwest was 
important, as it was the only area in the valley that was not flooded.
Seely’s Force faced the Silesian 11th rir  of the 117th Division. 
The Germans formed the 117th in April 1915, but the 11th rir  was a 
prewar reserve unit.77 Shortly after forming, the 117th Division fought 
in the French spring offensive in May and then at Loos in September. 
In both battles, it suffered heavy losses. By 1918, it was regarded as 
a second-rate division, so given the casualties it had already suffered 
in 1915, it was unlikely it was a first-class formation in late 1915.78
The trigger for the Barrier operation was the 2nd Infantry 
Brigade’s notably successful two-battalion raid on German positions 
across the Douve River, on the night of 15-16 November 1915. 
The 7th Battalion used portable bridges to cross the river, cut the 
German wire, and seize and hold part of the German frontline for 
twenty minutes. They brought back twelve prisoners and claimed 
to have inflicted up to fifty casualties on the Germans, with only 
one Canadian accidentally shot.79 The 5th Battalion encountered an 
unexpected sunken wire-filled ditch and was stymied in its attack. 
The raid brought considerable attention from the Allied side. The 
commander-in-chief of the bef, Sir John French, characterised the 
attack as “a brilliant little operation” in his final despatch.80 French 
circulated the raid’s plan throughout the British forces as a model 
of how to conduct such operations, and even the French showed 
interest.81 Sir John was concerned that too many units were adopting 
a ‘live and let live’ attitude which he believed would atrophy the 
troops’ offensive spirit, and raids like Petit Douve would increase their
77 “Reserve-Infanterie Regiment Nr. 11,” available at http://genwiki.genealogy.net/ 
RIR_11.
78 General Staff Intelligence Section, Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the 
German Army Which Participated in the War (1914-1918) (Government Publishing 
Office, 1920), 610.
79 Lipsett to Currie, 20 November 1915, GAQ 5-66, RG24 v1825, LAC.
80 Sir John French, “Sir John French’s Tenth Despatch, 31 July 1916,” http:// 
www.1914-1918.net/french_tenth_despatch.html.
81 La Petite Douve, LAC.
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aggressiveness.82 The success of the raid added to Currie’s reputation; 
thus, he would be especially sensitive to any failure on that sector.
The German brigade commander responsible for the sector was 
anxious that the raid would encourage further enterprises.83 To 
preclude a repeat of this embarrassing raid, the local commander 
planned on creating an advanced listening post halfway between 
the German and Canadian lines, and the only position certain to 
be above the floodwaters was the Messines-Ploegsteert Road. The 
Germans started making plans for the operation well in advance. The 
night selected for building the Barrier was a new moon and sure to be 
dark. The Canadian trenches in the immediate vicinity of where the 
Barrier was to be built were regularly shelled to keep the defenders 
tied down repairing damage. For instance, the German bombardment 
on 30 November was three times the usual rate of shelling.84 Further, 
the night before building the Barrier, the Germans cut off a Canadian 
listening post in front of trench 131 closest to the road to ensure the 
defenders were blinded.85 A Canadian Corps intelligence summary 
reported the bridge over the Douve on the road was repaired.86 This 
warning did not appear to raise any alarms among the defenders.
Heavy German shelling on 1 December inflicted sharp losses on 
the 3rd cmr Regiment, with ten killed and sixteen wounded. Officer 
casualties were so heavy that a major from another unit had to take 
over command of the forward squadron. The shelling also interrupted 
communications between the 1st cmr Brigade and its superiors.87 
This shelling, beyond the casualties and damage to trenches, had two 
effects on the future of the c m r . First, the lamentable administration of 
the 1st cmr Brigade elicited a stinging critique from Currie regarding 
their failure to report any deaths from the shelling.88 Second, Colonel 
Sissons, of the 1st cmr Brigade, made no effort to get in touch with 
his superiors for six hours during the communications interruption.89 
Owing to the multiple administrative and command issues in
82 Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare, 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System 
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980), 95.
83 La Petite Douve, LAC.
84 War Diary, 1st Division, RG9 III-D-3 v4826, LAC, 30 November 1915.
85 W.D., 2nd CMR Brigade, 1 December 1915, LAC.,
86 War Diary, Canadian Corps, 2 December 1916, RG9 III-D-3 v4812, LAC.
87 W.D., 1st Division, LAC, 1 December 1915.
88 1st Canadian Division to Canadian Corps, 7 December 1915, LAC.
89 Carson to Hughes, 28 December 1915, 6-S-137, RG9 III-A-1 v215 LAC.
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the 1st cmr Brigade, Seely sacked Sissons that day with Currie’s 
concurrence.90 The commander of the Canadian Corps, Lieutenant- 
General Edwin Alderson, later stated, “I do not think that Colonel 
Sissons is qualified or has the personality to train men for war.”91
On the night of 1-2 December, the Germans “noiselessly removed 
the pave blocks from the rear of the fallen tree, and, screened by 
the projecting branches, dug a trench across the road; utilizing the 
stone blocks together with bricks from the cottage ruins for the 
base of the parapet.”92 The Barrier ran across the width of the road 
and was anchored with strong points on each flank. The 2nd cmr 
Brigade did not report the presence of the Barrier until daylight 
on 2 December and the 1st cm r Brigade until 3 December; further 
indicating the lax performance of the brigade.93 Seely ordered the 1st 
cmr Brigade to probe the position, and the 2nd cmr Regiment sent 
its bombing officer and two men. They threw several bombs that fell 
short, received bombs that fell short, and retreated. They reported 
there was no wire in front of the Barrier.94 A staff officer from Seely’s 
Force, then, ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Bott 2nd cmr Regiment to 
make another attempt that night— causing the regiment to complain 
about insufficient time for planning.95 The patrol encountered wire 
and was unsuccessful. Bott apologised in his report: “I am sorry the 
result was not as satisfactory as one could wish but our men were 
not prepared to cope with wire entanglements which had been put up 
since the first demonstration.”96
The 1st Division sent Seely’s Force a peremptory demand “report 
why German works spoken of in your situation report this evening 
was not reported before. What steps are you taking to drive Germans 
out and destroy it tonight?”97 The regimental history of the 2nd cmr
90 War Diary, 1st Brigade Canadian Mounted Rifles, 1 December 1915, RG9 III-D-3 
V4946, LAC; Canadian Cavalry Brigade to 1st Canadian Division, 9 December 1915, 
11/16, RG9 III-D-2 v3987, LAC.
91 Alderson to Carson, Undated, (12-27 December 1915), 6-S-137, RG9 III-A-1 
v215 LAC.
92 La Petite Douve, LAC.
93 W.D., 2nd CMR Brigade, 2 December 1915, LAC; W.D., 1st CMR Brigade, 3 
December 1915, LAC.
94 W.D., 2nd CMR Regiment, 3 December 1915, LAC.
95 Johnston, The 2nd CMR, 16.
96 W.D., 2nd CMR Regiment, 4 December 1915, LAC.
97 1st Canadian Division to Seely’s Force, Undated (2 or 3 December 1915), 34/16, 
RG9 III-D-2 v4017, LAC.
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claimed, “The consternation raised at Canadian Headquarters by 
this barrier was tremendous, quite out of proportion to the causes.”98 
Seely ordered the 2nd cmr Brigade to attack the Barrier supported 
by artillery.99 As what seemed to accompany operations of the cm r , 
the heavy artillery battery commander cancelled his portion of the 
bombardment owing to inadequate observation and communications.100 
Seely’s resulting timid orders were for a patrol to observe the Barrier 
for an hour while the artillery hammered the position. Hampered 
by “exceptionally heavy wind and rain,” the patrol from the 4th 
cmr Regiment watched while the artillery fired 700 shells in a vain 
attempt to destroy the obstacle and then following orders withdrew. 
The resulting German counter bombardment inflicted five casualties 
and badly damaged the Canadian front trench.101 Thwarted again, 
Seely had to report to the 1st Division that the Barrier was not 
destroyed, but he improbably claimed observers heard many screams 
coming from the German position.102
The Canadian Cavalry Brigade replaced the 2nd cmr Brigade 
on 5 December. The next attempt on the Barrier was by lsh on 
the evening of 8-9 December. Patrols reported the German position 
lightly held, so the plan was to rush the Barrier, pull it down, and 
blow up what remained. The assault started at 1:45 a.m., as the 
sixteen-man party crept along the left side of the road to get into 
position. Instead of a small party of defenders, forty Germans guarded 
the Barrier, and they smothered the attack in hand grenades. Three 
men were wounded and captured, although they were reported killed 
at the time. Only two of the party escaped wounds or capture in 
the German counterattack. Despite the reconnaissance and claims 
that the men knew the ground, the lsh was badly surprised by the 
strength of the German defenders and the attack a fiasco.103 Seely 
was in a difficult position as three separate operations were abject 
failures, and he was quarrelling with Currie.
98 Johnston, The 2nd CMR, 16.
99 W.D., 4th CMR Regiment, 3 December 1915, LAC; 1st Canadian Division 
G.500, 4 December 1915, 34/16, RG9 III-D-2 v4017, LAC.
100 1st Canadian Division Arrtillery to 1st Canadian Division, 4 December 1915, 
34/16, RG9 III-D-2 v4017, LAC.
101 W.D., 2nd CMR Brigade, 4 December 1915, LAC.
102 Seely to Kearsely, 5 December 1915, 34/16, RG9 III-D-2 v4017, LAC.
103 1st Division to Canadian Corps G10-57, 10 December 1915, 34/16, RG9 III-D-2 
v4017, LAC; Report on Minor Operations Carried out by Lord Strathcona’s Horse, 
8 December 1915, 34/16, RG9 III-D-2 v4017, LAC.
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Seely’s fumbling and Currie’s anxiety regarding the cmr resulted 
in the 2nd Infantry Brigade’s insertion into the line a week early on 10 
December. The 5th Battalion complained that the, “Trenches in very 
bad condition, waterlogged. Dugouts caving in and parapets in state 
of disrepair.”104 On 11 December, Currie ordered the 2nd Infantry 
Brigade to eradicate the Barrier. The greater experience of the 2nd 
Infantry Brigade was evident in the operation’s planning and conduct. 
The rising floodwaters of the Douve River meant it was impossible 
to outflank the Barrier, so it had to be attacked directly. First, the 
Barrier was heavily bombarded for three days to obtain registration, 
cut the German wire, and reduce the garrison. The attack was further 
aided by an 18-pounder gun firing directly on the Barrier from the 
frontline. After painstaking preparation, a vehicle from the Motor 
Machine Gun Brigade towed the gun to a position just out of earshot 
of the Germans. The gunners manhandled it to a previously-prepared 
hole cut in the parapet. At zero hour, it commenced firing and the 
first round killed half of the defenders. At 2:05 a.m. 15 December 
1915, three parties of attackers from the 5th Battalion launched their 
assault. The German wire created an obstacle that slowed down the 
attackers, but the Canadians had little difficulty in overwhelming 
the small garrison. Four Germans were killed and two captured with 
only minor injuries to the Canadians.105 The attack was a success, 
but this was not surprising given the disparity of forces. It showed 
the considerable discrepancy in effectiveness between the 1st Division 
and Seely’s Force.
DAMAGE DONE
There was a litany of complaints about the cmr before and during 
the Barrier operation, with the final and harshest criticism coming 
from Currie— Seely’s superior. In a two-page excoriation of the cmr 
brigades sent 7  December, Currie wanted to insert the 2 nd Infantry 
Brigade a week early, as he no longer trusted the two cmr brigades 
with holding the front— something no other Canadian formation was
104 W.D., 5th Battalion, 10 December 1915, LAC.
105 The Germans only lightly held the Barrier at night with a small party of 
volunteers. La Petite Douve, LAC; G10-56, 10 December 1916, LAC; Minor 
Operations, LSH, LAC.
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criticised for. He listed multiple deficiencies with the two brigades, 
albeit he thought the men “a splendid lot.” He complained that at 
times only thirty percent of the men requested for working parties 
arrived punctually, and often the work was unsatisfactory. More 
importantly, the inability of the cmr to prevent the Germans building 
the Barrier and the abortive efforts to destroy it meant the cmr lost 
the 2 nd Infantry Brigade’s “moral ascendency” over the Germans 
and “it will cost the Infantry Brigade something to get it back.” 
Further, the cmr were lax regarding reports. Currie investigated 
engineer complaints regarding the 1st cmr Brigade, probably related 
to work parties, and found their complaints justified. Worse, two of 
the cmr regiment commanders had nothing but excuses when Currie 
confronted them, which particularly angered him. He summarised 
the issues as “The worse features about these cases of bad discipline 
and bad training which I have enumerated is that those concerned 
do not realise the serious nature of their shortcomings.” Currie’s 
reference to discipline meant the cmr officer’s readiness to fulfill 
orders and not to the behaviour of the troops. He recommended 
the authorities either reorganise and retrain the cmr as infantry or 
withdraw them.106
Seely received a copy of Currie’s denunciation, and responded 
with a tepid defence partly based on his only taking command of the 
cmr as they entered the line. He admitted to the claimed deficiencies 
in returns and work parties, and thought “greater vigilance might 
have prevented the enemy” from building the Barrier. Seely admitted 
the cmr lacking in “knowledge and efficiency in many respects” but 
they continued to stoutly defend their positions despite the heavy 
shelling. He claimed there was no desertion, no insubordination, and 
cmr troops stood up to the heavy shelling, as well as any men. This 
was not a stirring endorsement, as a commander should expect their 
troops not to desert or show signs of insubordination.107
The problems with the cmr reached the new Commander-in­
Chief of the b e f , General Sir Douglas Haig.108 In his view, while the 
cmr training and discipline was deficient, the “cause of any failures 
that had occurred must be attributed to the want of exercise of
106 1st Canadian Division to Canadian Corps, 7 December 1915, LAC.
107 Canadian Cavalry Brigade to 1st Canadian Division, 9 December 1915, LAC.
Douglas Haig replaced French as the commander-in-chief on 10 December 1915.108
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Canadian Mounted Rifles troopers in the trenches. France, 1915. [Library and Archives Canada 
PA 107276]
command on the part of the Commander of the Detachment.”109 
This strongly indicated Haig believed Seely was to blame. Possibly 
owing to a combination of the troubles encountered by Seely’s 
Force and Seely’s remaining influence, the British high command 
reorganised and remounted the Canadian Cavalry Brigade on 26 
January 1916.110
Currie’s damning report combined with Alderson’s complaints 
meant the already agreed upon conversion was imperative and needed 
to be accelerated. Brigadier-General Tim Harington, the Canadian 
Corps’ senior general staff officer, reported to the Second Army that 
the cmr were not combat effective, and their existing commanders and 
non-commissioned officers (ncos) could not rectify the situation. This
109 Kiggel to Cdn. Representative, LAC.
110 The Canadian Militia cavalry regiment the Fort Gary Horse replaced the KEH. 
Potter, “Canadian Cavalry on the Western Front,” 119; Seeley to General ?, 22 
November 1915, RG9 III-C-2, LAC; War Diary, Canadian Cavalry Brigade, RG9 
III-D-3 v4954, LAC, 26 January 1916.
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was a serious indictment of the cmr command cadre.111 Adding to 
their woes, Major-General M. Mercer, the commander of the Canadian 
Corps Troops, inspected the cmr regiments, and his findings were 
devastating. He reported “neither of these Brigades know anything 
about infantry work and have no instructors capable of teaching it, 
and that there is a certain amount of resentment at being reorganised 
as infantry, and in his opinion the Brigades lack discipline, though 
the material is excellent. The task is, therefore, more difficult than 
that of training raw recruits.”112 The Second Army, on 24 December, 
authorised the formation of the 8th Brigade by consolidating the six 
cmr regiments into four infantry battalions— the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 
5th cm r , along with additional personnel from England.113 Brigadier- 
General Victor Williams took command of the 8th Brigade on 29 
December 1915.114 Williams was a pf cavalry officer who served in 
the Boer War in the r c d , commanded the r c d , was the Inspector 
of Cavalry from 1907 to 1912, and was the Adjutant-General at the 
start of the war.115 He was an experienced officer but had no infantry 
service. Williams’ command was brief, as he was captured in the 
opening stages of the German attack on Mount Sorrel on 2 June 1916.
Were the cmr markedly worse than other Canadian units in their 
initial commitment at the front? Most Canadian units had problems 
with training and discipline, such as the issues faced by the 1st 
Canadian Division on Salisbury Plain over the winter of 1914-1915.116 
At the Second Battle of Ypres, however, the division performed 
better than is usually asserted despite the manifest command and 
staff failures at the brigade and division levels.117 No Canadian units 
experienced the number and severity of complaints regarding unit 
leadership as did the cm r . Further, Canadian commanders, like 
Currie, were unlikely to make allowances for recently arrived units
111 Harington to 2nd Army, G.478, 16 December 1915, 109/9, RG9 III-C-1 v3868, LAC.
112 Canadian Corps to 2nd Army, 19 December 1916, 109/9, RG9 III-C-1 v3868, LAC.
113 The 3rd and 6th CMR Regiments were disbanded with their personnel going to 
the remaining CMR units. War Diary, Canadian Corps, Second Army O.B./1140, 24 
December 1915, RG9 III-D-3 v4812, LAC.
114 W.D., 1st CMR Brigade, 29 December 1915, LAC.
115 Defence, Quarterly Militia List, 59.
116 Nicholson, CEF, 36-38; Cook, At the Sharp End, 69-82.
117 For more on the performance of the 1st Division, see Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring 
Soldiers: The 1st Canadian Division at War, 1914-1915 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2008), 35, 96; Stewart, “ ‘Every Inch a Soldier,’ ” 74-75.
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given the rising reputation of Canadian forces, such as the credit to 
Currie’s division for the earlier raid across the Douve.
On 31 December, Alderson called the officers of the two brigades 
to the headquarters of the newly raised 3rd Division to announce the 
breakup of the two cmr brigades and the formation of the 8th Brigade.118 
To train the infantry, the 1st and 2nd Divisions supplied instructors and 
the new brigade spent January in intense training. The conversion to 
infantry involved a change to using the infantry drill manual and orders 
of command, which were a major adjustment especially for the ncos 
and officers. The brigade entered the line on 31 January 1916.119
There were extensive changes to the command structure to reflect 
the new organisation. A captain in the 4th cmr Regiment expressed 
the hope “they can find a way of changing us into infantry without 
cutting anybody’s head off.”120 The conversion, however, did result in 
heads rolling. The commander of the 1st cmr Brigade, Colonel Sissons, 
was sacked, and he resigned his commission. He promptly returned 
to Canada with his Aide-de-camp and probably only his standing 
in Canada prevented his being cashiered for incompetence.121 Smart 
of the 2nd Brigade refused the offer to command one of the newly 
converted cmr regiments, and Carson found his old friend a reserve 
brigade in England.122 Smart was resentful about his removal despite 
his special handling and complained to Steele, now commanding 
a training command in England, and Carson. Later in 1918-1919, 
Smart was a considerable thorn in the side of the government.123 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. Shaw, the commander of the defunct 6th 
cmr Regiment, replaced Lieutenant-Colonel H.I. Stephenson of the 
1st cmr Regiment. As was common practice, Stephenson complained 
to Steele about losing his regiment.124 The commander of the 4th cmr 
R egiment transferred as he did not want to command an infantry
118 The 3rd Division consisted of the 7th and 8th Brigades already in France and the 
9th Brigade forming in England. W.D., 2nd CMR Brigade, 31 December 1915, LAC.
119 War Diary, 8th Brigade, 31 January 1916, RG9 III-D-3 v4894, LAC.
120 Symons to Dear People, 27 December 1915, MG30 E456, Symons Fonds; LAC.
121 Carson to Alderson, 28 December 1915, 31/4, RG9 III-C-2 v3884, LAC.
122 Carson to Hughes, 26 January 1916, 6-S-19, RG9 III-A-1 v213, LAC.
123 Steele Diary, 4 January 1916, 2008.1.1.2.68, Steele Fonds; Bruce Peel Special 
Collections Library, University of Alberta; Turner to Kemp, 5 April 1919, MG27 II 
D9 v136, Kemp Fonds; LAC; Turner to Kemp, 3 April 1919, MG30 E46 v7, Turner 
Fonds; LAC; Brigadier-General Charles Smart File, 10-S-68, RG9 III v331, LAC.
124 Steele Diary, 12 January 1916, Bruce Peel Special Collections Library, University 
of Alberta.
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Lieut.-Col. J.C.L. Bott, O.C. 2nd Canadian 
Mounted Rifles in 1915. [Library and 
Archives Canada PA 025227]
unit, and Major J.F.H. Ussher replaced him.125 The two brigade majors 
of the cmr Brigades and the commander of the 3rd cmr Regiment, 
Lieutenant-Colonel I.J. Whitaker, also returned to England.
The majority of the officers understood the need to convert, but 
there were still many who refused to serve in the infantry. Alderson’s 
attitude to the cmr did not help matters, as the regimental history of 
the 2nd cmr Regiment reported Alderson telling the newly converted 
unit that “after keeping us waiting long after the time set for the 
inspection, kindly told us were not quite soldiers yet, but might hope 
to be some day.”126 127Official policy stipulated that the requirements of 
the service governed officers’ transfers. In this instance, however, given 
the unpopularity of the conversion and that they were Canadians, the 
office responsible for managing officer’s careers, allowed transfers out of 
the cm r .127 The 3rd Division indicated twenty-five officers transferred 
in the wake of the reorganisation, suggesting the depth of frustration at
125 Bennett, 4th CMR, 13.
126 Johnston, The 2nd CMR, 18.
127 Vesey, AMS for MS, 27 January 1916, 31/4, RG9 III-C-2 v3884, LAC.
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the forced conversion.128 129There were few positions available for cavalry 
officers in a combat role, so most ended up in England.
The 1st Division did not let the cmr forget about their failure, 
including a piece of doggerel in the trench newspaper of the 7th 
Battalion criticizing the cm r .129 The situation grew so rancorous that 
Currie had to order his division to stop disparaging the cm r . This 
was an element of Alderson’s replacement, Lieutenant-General Sir 
Julian Byng’s efforts to eliminate the petty jealousies and contention 
between the divisions to create a truly Canadian Corps.130
The reputation of the cmr suffered another blow when the 8th 
Brigade faced the main thrust of the German attack at Mount Sorrel 
on 2 June 1916 and suffered crippling losses. The 2nd cmr Battalion 
was in reserve and did not participate in any attacks, yet still suffered 
fifty percent losses, the 1st cmr Battalion in the frontline lost 557 
men out of its 692, and of the 4th cmr Battalion had only seventy- 
six remaining out of its initial 702 officers and men.131 The Germans 
also killed or captured the brigade commander and three of the four 
battalion commanders, and the experience shattered the nerves of 
the one survivor, Bott of the 2nd cmr Battalion.132 As a result of 
devastating losses, the brigade had to be rebuilt and retrained again, 
this time with instructors from the British Guards Division.133 The 
brigade performed well at Courcelette in September 1916 and it 
experienced similar successes and failures, as did other units during 
the remainder of the Somme campaign and continued success in the 
battles and campaigns in 1917 and 1918.
As a comparison to the fate of the cm r , the Australian Light 
Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles served with distinction in 
the Middle East as mounted rifle formations, other than when holding 
the line at Gallipoli. British yeomanry regiments did not serve on the 
Western Front in yeomanry brigades, but five served with regular 
cavalry brigades on the Western Front, and eleven as corps cavalry 
regiments, with eight of these later converted to infantry in 1918,
128 3 CID A/50-17, 31 January 1916, 31/4, RG9 III-C-2 v3884, LAC.
129 “The Barricade,” The Listening Post, 30 March 1916; Johnston, The 2nd CMR, 16.
130 Byng replaced Alderson as Canadian Corps commander in May 1916. Cook, At 
the Sharp End, 345.
131 Johnston, The 2nd CMR, 22; Cook, At the Sharp End, 351; Bennett, 4th CMR, 19.
132 Bott Correspondence File, 6-B-516, RG 9 III-A-1 v119, LAC; Elmsley to 3rd 
Division, 12 November 1916, 2/4, RG 9 III-C-3 v4144, LAC.
133 Canadian Corps G.541, 8 June 1916, 109/8, RG9 III-C-1 v3868, LAC.
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owing to a dearth of infantry replacements. The yeomanry regiments, 
much like the Canadian units that served in the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade, trained and served like full-fledged cavalry formations. 
As David Kenyon in Horsemen in No Man’s Land argues, British 
cavalry including Canadian and yeomanry units performed far better 
than is usually acknowledged but their operational contribution was 
hampered by command and communication limitations at senior levels 
of leadership in the cavalry and overall army up to 1918.134 Prewar 
British cavalry units trained to infantry musketry standards with the 
same rifle used by the infantry, and so were far more capable than 
continental cavalry units in holding the line. Further, British cavalry 
retained a much larger corps of prewar men, ncos, and officers than 
did infantry units throughout the war. As a result, the cavalry were 
better trained and prepared for active service than were the cmr.135 
Further, thirty-two yeomanry regiments converted into infantry or 
machine gun battalions reached the front in 1918 in reaction to the 
German spring offensive.136
POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS
Surprisingly, the failure at the Barrier did not dramatically affect the 
postwar fate of the cmr. The 1919 Otter Committee on the postwar 
organisation of the army created a “revisionary, largely notional, 
land force establishment” that looked back rather than to the 
future.137 One of the striking aspects of the proposed structure was 
that, despite the limited role of cavalry on the Western Front, militia 
cavalry regiments only dropped from thirty-five in 1914 to thirty- 
one regiments in 1921. In Militia Myths, Wood argues the retention 
of cavalry regiments was more for their suitability for quelling 
uprisings like the Winnipeg Strike of 1919 than their war fighting
134 David Kenyon, Horsemen in No Man’s Land: British Cavalry and Trench 
Warfare, 1914-1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2011). e-Book.
135 Ibid., Loc 6001.
136 John Ellis and Michael Cox, The World War I  Databook: The Essential Facts 
and Figures for All the Combatants (London: Aurum, 2001), 154-157.
137 John A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of 
Failure in High Command (New York: Praeger, 1991), 19-20.
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capabilities.138 The Canadian cavalry now had a mixed heritage, as 
the Canadian Cavalry Brigade trained and fought as traditional 
cavalry, so the prewar mounted rifles concept was unproven in battle. 
In Australia, based on the experience of the alh in Palestine, the 
militia units were trained to full cavalry status.139 Like Australia, the 
Canadian mounted rifles fought a long rearguard action to justify 
mounted forces in a country where machinery was increasingly 
replacing horses.140 The viability of cavalry was further imperilled by 
the military’s motorisation, and all the cavalry regiments that served 
overseas in the Second World War were converted reconnaissance or 
armoured units.
CONCLUSION
The cmr were born out of the mix of military exigency, the need 
for a form of light cavalry and mobile firepower, the financial 
realities governing the Canadian military, and a supposed affinity 
of Canadians for this form of warfare. The success of mounted rifles 
in the two Boer wars strongly indicated this hybrid of infantry 
and cavalry was an ideal fit for militaries dependent on volunteer 
part-time soldiers. When tested on the Western Front, however, 
the mounted rifles floundered, with the units at the front converted 
into infantry and no further mounted rifle regiments raised. Five 
factors of organisation, leadership, training, the demand for more 
infantry, and tensions between senior commanders all contributed to 
this failure. The cmr organisation and concept envisioned operating 
across long distances and not engaging the main enemy force for a 
sustained period, which was the situation on the Western Front. Its 
fundamental organizing principle of units of three did not conform to 
defensive positions designed for the infantry’s organisation of four. 
As a result, it was a difficult task to deploy the cmr in defences 
designed for infantry units.
Compounding the problems with the organisation was the cmr 
weak leadership. Sissons’ sacking and resignation was unusually
138 James A. Wood, Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896­
1921 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 258-264.
139 Bou, Light Horse, 229-230.
140 Ibid., 238.
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View of the Third Canadian Mounted Rifle troops, organized by Lt. Col. F.O. Sissons on 
parade of inspection on the athletic grounds in Riverside, 1915. [Esplanade Arts and Heritage 
Centre Archives, Cypress Club Fonds, 0126.0029]
brutal for the cef, where face-saving reasons were usually found 
for failures’ transfers back to England or Canada.141 For instance, 
the authorities masked failures as egregious as the 16th Battalion’s 
Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Currie’s fleeing at the Second Battle of Ypres. 
He was reported as returning to Canada because of gas poisoning.142 
Sisson’s removal, therefore, suggests a particularly poor performance. 
Further, Smart, despite his close ties to Hughes and Carson, received 
no further commands at the front. The probable conviction of the 
commander of the 6th cmr Regiment also tarnished the reputation 
of the cmr leadership. The departure of so many officers refusing to 
serve in the infantry also indicated an unfavourable attitude among 
some cmr officers. It was clear that there were problems with the cmr 
leadership, and more seriously, they seemed unaware of the issues or 
at least refused to acknowledge them.
Inadequate training for their dismounted role also hampered 
the cmr. Although embodied for almost a year by the time of the 
Barrier, the focus on mounted rifle drill resulted in an inadequately 
trained cmr. Rather than shifting to a full infantry training when 
dismounted, the cmr received only supplemental instruction in the
141 For examples from the 2nd Division in the aftermath of St. Eloi, see Stewart, 
“ ‘Every Inch a Soldier,’ ” 141, 150.
142 Note on Back of Letter Creelman to Duguid, Undated MG30 E8 v1, Creelman 
Fonds; LAC; Kim Beattie, 48th Highlanders of Canada, 1891-1928 (Canada: The 
Highlanders, 1932).
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infantry arts. Given the later complaints about training, the cmr 
officers did not know enough of infantry drill to effectively train their 
men. Further, the stable duties detracted from the time needed for 
trench warfare preparation.
The larger issue of a two division corps had a major effect on the 
fate of the cmr. With two divisions it was effectively impossible to 
withdraw a division for rest and training; hence, the need for more 
infantry. Adding a third division solved this problem, and the cmr 
unsuitability for trench warfare made them an obvious candidate for 
conversion. Even with a brilliant performance at the Barrier, the cmr 
would still have been converted, but their failure made it much easier 
to justify the change.
Tensions between Currie and the Canadians and Seely’s command 
of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade affected the cmr reputation. Currie 
did not suffer fools gladly nor was he willing to make allowances, so 
the cmr effectiveness under Seely was certain to nettle Currie. It is 
apparent from the exchange of letters that Currie had little or no 
respect for Seely’s competence, and this also affected his view of the 
cmr. Further, Currie was certain to be sensitive to any failures in a 
sector where his 2nd Infantry Brigade had won so many accolades 
with its November raid.
The Barrier engagement was less than a minor operation but 
the cmr operations, even taking into consideration their situation, 
demonstrated clear deficiencies. Currie was correct that their 
organisation, training, and leadership were faulty, and Seely’s less 
than inspiring defence indicated there were serious issues in the two 
cmr brigades. Their failure was as much a result of poor preparation 
by the Canadian Corps in readying them for the front. The weeks 
the two brigades provided working parties in October and November 
would have been better spent in intense infantry training. After the 
Barrier, the new 8th Brigade spent a month in instruction before 
the Canadian Corps considered it could be trusted with defending 
a section of the front, so there was sufficient time to ready the cmr. 
It was not, however, until the cmr received further training after 
the defeat at Mount Sorrel did the cmr battalions perform at the 
standard of the rest of the Canadian Corps.
The Barrier demonstrated the consequences of committing a force 
to a task for which they were not intended. As the success of the alh 
in Palestine indicates, the mounted rifles concept was viable but only 
if the right conditions pertained. Given the unforgiving nature of the
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Western Front, it was unrealistic to expect troopers drilled to fight 
in mobile engagements to serve as infantrymen without extensive 
training. It further suggests that the organisation, training and 
leadership of the cmr was too narrowly focused on a single mission 
and lacked the ability to adapt to new tasks.
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